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Abstract
The paper presents my first findings and reflections on how ordinary people may opportunistically and unpredictably
respond to Internet censorship and tracking. I try to capture this process with the concept of ‘hacking multitude’.
Working on a case study of the Turkish government’s block of the social media platform Twitter (March 2014), I argue
that during systemic data choke-points, a multitude of users might acquire a certain degree of reflexivity over ubiquitous
software of advanced techno-capitalism. Resisting naı¨ve parallels between urban streets and virtual global streets, the
article draws on Fuller’s ‘media ecologies’ to make sense of complex and dynamic interactions between processes and
materialities, strategies of communication and mundane practices. Such a dense space is mostly invisible to network and
traffic analysis, although it comes alive under the magnifying lens of digital ethnography. As the Turkish government tried
to stop protesters on both the urban and the Twitter spheres, alternative material configurations and new hybrid
formations and practices emerged. I try to bring this process alive following the traces – that is, a combination of digital
data and materialities – of a social space between the protest for Twitter access, the ‘digital coup’ and the interactions
that this situation determined. In the final section, I briefly explore two research trajectories which can further develop
my initial formulation of a ‘hacking multitude’. I argue that a generalisation of hacking/multitude is problematic for the
political, cultural or economic processes more directly associated with Big Data.
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The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes
around it. (Jon Gilmore, founder of the Electronic
Frontier Foundation)
Con-text
Ten days before Turkish local elections, on 20 March
2014, PM Tayyip Erdogan blocked access to Twitter:
allegations of Erdogan’s corruption had circulated on
the social media platform, receiving little notice outside
Turkey. This dramatically changed when they eventu-
ally tried to stop people from tweeting altogether. Mr
Erdogan firstly deployed a well-known discourse
around social media as ‘bad’, since they can corrupt
people’s morality.1 This is a strategy of placing media
outside the sacred sphere: social media in particular,
with their inherently global audience, resemble a for-
eign invasion tearing apart the fabric of society.2
The blockage on Twitter began [at] circa 11 pm. All of a
sudden users started to talk about how some of their
friends couldn’t log in on Twitter. After a couple [of]
hours I also couldn’t log in, so I followed the news on
my Facebook timeline. (Online interview)
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Despite the block imposed on Twitter, hashtags con-
cerning Turkey censorship started to trend from the
next day, so attracting more users: tweets and
unblocked social media increasingly showcased alterna-
tive workarounds, initiating a ‘hacking game’ which
I follow below.
The paper narrates this Internet censorship attempt
and its circumvention, following two main leads.
Drawing from diverse data points, I first suggest that
the combination of denial of service, social media prac-
tices and hackers’ intervention started a learning curve
in people being affected by the ban. A certain degree of
users’ reflexivity and the resulting repository of techno-
logical expertise are crucial to the workings of a
‘hacking multitude’. In the first instance, ‘multitude’ is
intended as a mass of ordinary Internet users whose
daily media practices, opportunistically and unpredict-
ably, are means of digital and informational production
(Virno, 2003).
The second reflection this paper wants to start is
around the implications that a potential generalization
of hacking practices might have for the political, cul-
tural or economic processes more directly associated
with Big Data. My initial findings show that new
social and material assemblages started producing
data over and beyond Twitter. I will foreground traces
of this generative social space which, I contend, is made
invisible in the Big Data flow.
In order to grasp the complexity of this emerging
media system, which has not a single entity responsible
for it nor is it simply imposed from above, I draw on
Fuller’s reworking of the term ‘ecology’: a ‘massive and
dynamic interrelation of processes and objects, beings
and things, patterns and matter’ (Fuller, 2005: 2). To
understand the multi-layered, non-linear, unfolding of
media ecologies, Fuller suggests attending to the live-
ness of the event, to participate in the interactions of
these systems ‘with no control sample’. Partly, the
events narrated here are an attempt to bring this pro-
cess alive. The story unfolds using tweets and photo-
graphs as they became available on Twitter during a
massive stand against censorship, which I followed
throughout. My narrative juxtaposes moments of med-
iatic synthesis, made of Big Data configurations, and
some ‘basic practices of how people construct the social
and cultural world’ (Couldry, 2012: 137). These prac-
tices are generally hidden in aggregate statistics, but
they become more intense under the magnifying lens
of digital ethnography.
In the second part of the paper, I integrate online
data with online interviews of Turkish Twitter users.
I haven’t been directly involved in the observation of
the Turkish protests from the streets.3 However, I man-
aged to reach some protagonists of the events I narrate,
thanks to intense snowballing, following and
negotiations on the terms of our online interaction
(e.g. encrypted conversations), through specific mailing
lists, social media and forums. These interviews there-
fore contain for me a wealth of details and perspectives
from the ‘field’.4
In the end, I develop the concept of a ‘hacking multi-
tude’. I argue that basic practices of hackerdom and
their potential recurrence in the economies of digital
information can become, at least temporarily, crucial
elements in the architecture of the Internet. Ultimately,
they can change the morphology of data itself. In so
doing, a social process of collaboration, learning and
reflexivity starts appearing, at least with regard to con-
testation of Internet access.
This article focuses on Turkey because, differently
from many other countries that experienced the so-
called ‘Web 2.0 Revolutions’, it has a potential critical
mass of users where digital devices and social media
platforms are part of many people’s everyday life.
Turkey ranks 4th in number of Facebook members
and 11th in terms of Twitter users: the exponential
increase in social media users is also due to traditional
media being heavily centralised and censored (Furman,
forthcoming). Twitter became popular in Turkey on the
wave of #OccupyGeziPark uprising:
TV and other media did not cover the events: mobile
phones became the TV, photos were published on
Twitter and other websites. Citizen journalism became
the de facto news agency for all. (Online interview)
Much has been written on the connections between
social media and recent street protests. Castells suggests
that the Internet creates protests. Speaking about a trad-
ition of ‘techno-euphoria and techno-determinism’
(Fuchs, 2013), he argues that the Internet is ‘a necessary
though not sufficient component. . . decisive to social
movements’ (2012, in Fuchs, 2013: 84). In Twitter,
some see an instrument essential for designing the chore-
ography of the assembly during street protests
(Gerbaudo, 2012), and generally being an effectivemega-
phone (Murthy, 2013). Developing a politics of presence
in the global city, Georgiou (2013: 142) suggests that for
marginal groups ‘the physical space of the city is no
longer enough. The urban street is revived and extended
to the global mediated street’. A large-scale research on
the 2011 London riots, ‘Reading the Riots’, however,
found that there was no significant evidence of Twitter
being central to the organisation of the riots. Despite the
moral panic around social media that the events
sparked, their analysis of over 2.5 million tweets shows
that the popular platform was rather used to organise
post-riot clean-up operations.5 Social media are not the
cause of protests, Fuchs (2013: 204) concludes, rather a
‘mirror of the power structures we find in society’.
2 Big Data & Society
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An evaluation of the effects of digital insurgency on
the Turkish political landscape is beyond the scope of
this paper. There are, however, some open questions,
particularly during transformative moments, around
how data is made manifest to us and the processes
that make this data possible. How is the morphology
of digital data being changed by the evolving political
landscape? To what extent can a generalised form of
digital disobedience effectively change the consistency
and relevance of Big Data, such as Twitter traffic ana-
lysis or grouping by hashtag? Moreover, what config-
urations would users form in relation to their online
privacy and their right to use the Internet in a scenario
of state surveillance? What kind of social alliances are
forged during circumvention of Internet censorship?
According to De Landa, our ‘mathematical technology’
was always incapable of modelling self-organising phe-
nomena: ‘non-linearities were eliminated as much as
possible from mathematical models, making non-
linear effects like chaos ‘‘invisible’’’ (De Landa in
Crary and Kwinter, 1992: 133). An analysis of multiple
data points, such as tweets, photographs and inter-
views, rather allows the fine grain of a social process,
which the very notion of ‘data flow’ hides, to come
alive.
Governments, such as Egypt, China or Pakistan,
generally have had good or modest results in imple-
menting Internet censorship (Deibert, 2009, 2012), but
its impact on protests is ultimately uncertain.
Censorship attempts are incomplete and evolving too:
in Turkey, for instance, tougher measures are now
being introduced, involving controversial spying soft-
ware and more centralised administration of the
Internet.6 There are more dedicated studies on this
matter (e.g. Deibert, 2009, 2012), but I want to flag
up governments’ adoption of paid ‘trolls’ in order to
shift public opinion on social media.7 In my view, this is
a sign that censorship and filtering alone, although on a
massive scale, cannot address the full dynamism of
media ecologies of digital communication.
Governments too need media practices, they need to
play on the same ground of, and in fact they hack,
the ‘hacking multitude’.
Materialities
I will now start unfolding the ecology around the
‘digital coup’. This is made of institutional constraints,
which I sketched in the introductory section, Big Data
representations, discussed in the next section, and mate-
rialities. A focus on materialities – as both media prac-
tices and physical infrastructures – not only
demonstrates that data does not simply flow at a
push of a button but also shows how social space
comes alive in the choke-points of such a ‘flow’.
Initially, the Twitter ban in Turkey was a simple
block at domain level. Domain Name Service (DNS)
is a distributed and hierarchical system which trans-
lates human readable hostnames (www.twitter.com)
into the numeric IP address required to resolve that
request (for instance, 204.71.177.71).8 DNS is a sort of
phone book of the Internet, which indexes IP
addresses for website. Unlike a phone book, DNS
can be quickly updated, allowing a service’s location
on the network to change without affecting end users,
who continue to use the same host name. DNS is
organised in a hierarchical fashion with 13 very power-
ful root name servers at the top level. ‘Copies’ of these
super-servers are distributed worldwide via a network
addressing and routing methodology which sends
requests to the topologically nearest node in a group
of potential receivers. This has accelerated a decentra-
lised service, with the deployment of physical (rather
than logical) root-servers outside the US: for example,
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OpenDNS is a distributed service over geographically
dispersed servers, claiming a ‘self-healing network
across three continents’ (OpenDNS.com).
‘Self-healing’ is a relevant concept here. If any regional
server is affected by outage or block, the whole traffic can
be re-routed to the nearest (physical) location. In this
configuration, the Internet is typically represented as a
complex ‘network of networks’:
The block was simply directing users to a web page
which said ‘Twitter is banned via jurisdiction’, which
was not. Telecom companies adjusted their DNS ser-
vers in order to advertise that page as Twitter. Many
people switched DNS servers. (Online interview)
This simple geopolitics of the Internet reminds us of
Castells’ vision. The network is seen from the perspec-
tive of nodes and set in the context of online freedom
from ‘attacks’, malware software or censorships.
However, Castells’ configuration ‘leaves unresolved
the relative causal weight of everyday context versus
operations of networks or people’s positioning within
networks’ (Couldry, 2012: 115, emphases added).
Material practices and non-humans are constitutive
parts of Internet ecologies. They produce digital data
via their relentless labour. They are the network too,
part of the everyday context in which networks operate.
I will discuss practices in the second part of the paper,
with lots of details and stories that came out from my
online interviews with some Turkish tweeps. Materials
make the main argument of this section: a physical
architecture of the Net starts to appear. This has been
unveiled by the very block that meant to make it
unavailable to the wider public in the first place.
Observers’ eyes were by now set on any statistical
indicators that could capture what was going on in
Turkey: How successful was the block? Did traffic
reveal an adequate response from users?
Big numbers
I now discuss some metrics around the popularity of
Twitter in Turkey and around Twitter hashtags that
were trending during the ‘digital coup’.9 I present
below two groups of quantitative indicators, as they
became available during the period of observation.
1. Hours after the attempt at blocking Twitter, news
grew under the headline/hashtag: #Twitteris
BlockedinTurkey, and similar. The infographic
below was circulated over 4000 times (considering
only direct re-tweets) on the same day Occupy
Wall Street NYC produced it.
Part of the online world seemed to identify them-
selves with Twitter users being blocked in Turkey,
while Turkish users became aware of being ‘trending’
on the platform. Infographics’ powerful message is to
4 Big Data & Society
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sample and aggregate large swathes of users and to
make representations speak for an imagined commu-
nity of people. They are not just aesthetically appealing
forms of visualisation of often dry data. Digital com-
munication fabricates data, but data enacts ‘people’. It
creates instances of ontological consistency of a subject
(Ruppert, 2011). In this sense, hashtags are powerful
forms of aggregation, although they are rather weak
for measuring belonging. The crucial thing is that
Twitter transforms grouping by hashtags into ‘trends’,
by the way of publishing metrics on their popularity.
Trend is per se a piece of information insomuch as it
circulates on more traditional media, which monitor
Twitter metrics as an approximation of the interest in
a certain subject. Communication therefore becomes
data, which is turned into information: a circular repe-
tition of the same.
2. Traffic analysis from diverse sources suggested that
restrictions had failed to stop digital insurgency
against censorship. Mikko Hypponen, Chief
Researcher at F-Secure,10 shared a graph which
shows an increase of 138% on the volume of
tweets from Turkey in the immediate hours after
the ban: this is equivalent to ‘some 17,000 tweets
every minute’.11
Looking at some indirect indicators, there are rea-
sons to believe that a vast part of the contribution to
the trend on the social platform was coming from
Turkey itself. Twitter’s popularity in Turkey is gener-
ally very high. Turkish is ranked as the eighth language
spoken on the social media platform, accounting for
the 2% of all tweets exchanged globally (Leetaru
et al., 2013); the Turkish president, Abdullah Gul,
who famously tweeted after the ban imposed by his
government, is ranked third in the league of Twitter
followers among world leaders (with a staggering
4.2 million followers)12; with a percentage of Twitter
users higher than the US (79% vs. 73%), Turkish
tweeps are at the top of the world chart.13
Despite providing a useful entry point in the discus-
sion of online censorship, traffic analysis does not
reveal the complexities of how data is generated in
transformative moments. Big Data analysis gives the
impression that measures to circumvent the block had
spread fast, reflecting a more generalised political
opposition in Turkey. My contention is that new
social and material assemblages were conditioning –
and were in turn conditioned by – this new data flow,
in a dialectical and non-linear manner. While the paper
does not specifically investigate what this meant for
Turkish society and its changing political landscape, it
attempts to foreground traces of this generative social
space made invisible in aggregate analysis.
Small numbers
In order to capture this emerging process, we need to
equip ourselves with other tools. I first build on my
direct engagement as an active tweep during the
events I narrate here. Drawing on the anthropological
scholarship emerging in response to the Internet (Hine,
2000, 2013; Underberg, 2013), I use digital ethnography
with discourse/content analysis of: tweets, photographs
circulated on the platform, and links included in tweets
(few thousands overall). I then circulated my research
blurb on mailing lists and social networks, managing to
interview some Turkish Twitter users who actively took
part in the events.14 These interviews are therefore
direct accounts from the ‘field’, the social space between
the Turkish block of Twitter and users’ attempts to
circumvent such censorship.
‘Digital ethnography’ is here intended as a method
with multiple data points to allow for immersion in
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the experience of another culture (Underberg, 2013),
a protest culture in this case. Digital ethnographers’
toolkit to study the Internet evolves with every setting,
kind of data, subject and site, as these become available
or useful to her: ‘Unlike big data studies which often
aggregate data across single platforms, ethnography
can explore how events in one place are made meaning-
ful, in surprising and contingent ways, in another’ (Hine,
2013). While digital ethnography helps the researcher to
connect with the ‘field’ under observation, sociological
discourse analysis allows imagination and reciprocity
between otherwise seemingly distinct realities, the vir-
tual and the actual. Discourse analysis in digital ethnog-
raphy explores the way in which accounts are made
convincing while maintaining the critical distance of
the ethnographer. At the same time, ‘the analyst presents
herself as a competent cultural member’, adding validity
to the set of data collected (Hine, 2000: 143).
The relation between what appears to happen online
– increasingly conveyed by Big Data metrics (number
of followers, friends, likes, shares, etc.) – and how social
life is constructed everyday – undeniable domain of
ethnographic tradition – is a tricky balance in digital
ethnography. It requires attending to both detailed
online observation and to the awareness that most of
this material is already present as digital data. In the
next section, I try to foreground the social space around
the Twitter ban. This ‘social’ emerges in a contingent
process of Internet surveillance from a nation state and
spreads through streets and digital media, in the con-
text of daily engagement with communication technol-
ogy, production of digital data and political opposition.
Re-text
By now, the problem became how to communicate
alternative DNS numbers and instructions to Turkish
people who were unable to connect to Twitter in the
first place.
The info [about DNS] was all over Facebook and even
the mainstream newspapers had articles that would give
guidelines.
The word [about VPN] got around fast on the day
Twitter was blocked. Facebook posts were already cir-
culating beforehand.
My friends and colleagues asked me if I could access
YouTube and/or Google, and also how to do it. I
helped them to change settings. The advice rapidly
spread far and wide via friend-to-friend network.
One [of] my colleagues sent an email about a simple
guide for using VPN and proxies. (Online interviews)
These extracts foreground a vernacular element of
proximity in experiencing a global network: friends,
colleagues, word-of-mouth and face-to-face inter-
actions. Importantly, workarounds were also repeated
on physical walls and other material objects. Their mes-
sage was in the form of an alpha-numeric string, such as
the now ubiquitous 8.8.8.8, Google DNS sequence.
Google DNS servers were written on walls and leaflets.
(Online interview)
Q: How wide spread was the attempt to reconnect to
Twitter? A: It was very widespread, everyone wanted to
do it, even my mum. People were putting DNS num-
bers on their windows. (Skype interview)
This is when part of Turkey seemed to familiarise them-
selves with the rules of a game few had thought they
needed to play: only one of my interviewees had tried
to circumvent censorship during a previous YouTube
ban. Crucially, they all say that they will definitely do
the same in future.
Photographs that circulated on Twitter help to
render this climate of growing awareness around
Internet freedom.
It is a contention of visual sociology scholars that
photographs give texture to place and help to
strengthen arguments (Knowles and Sweetman, 2004).
Maybe because they carry and reproduce a reservoir of
affective responses (Terranova, 2004). They are com-
pressed, edited, aligned with text, they irremediably
become ‘poor images’: ‘The poor image is a copy in
motion. Its quality is bad, its resolution substandard.
As it accelerates, it deteriorates’ (Steyerl, 2009). Large
numbers of photographs started circulating on Twitter
and other media, becoming a phenomenon in itself.
Photographs are digital data too, a combination of
6 Big Data & Society
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pixels and bits. They, however, need to be emphasised,
since they disappear from view when aggregated in
trending hashtags. Photographs are important because
they evoke context: specific people, places or events.
They provide a sort of ‘existence proof’, a reminder
of people in ‘flesh and blood’ (Becker, 2002). I would
argue that this material dimension is somehow lost in
Big Data analysis.
I selected some photographs from the usual deluge
of Twitter data, while following live the ‘digital coup’ in
Turkey. They are presented here as episodic vignettes,
exactly like ethnographers would use extracts of long
interviews, or a network analyst would isolate particu-
lar tweets out of thousands. Triangulated with other
data, they will hopefully give the reader a heuristic
grasp on this composite scenario: a banknote,
10 Turkish Liras, with the Google alpha-numeric
inscription; a restaurant menu outside an al-fresco
patio, with iPhone and Google DNS instructions; a
few citizens gathering around a poster which explains
how to re-connect to Twitter.
I find this latest photo particularly helpful in revealing
what a ‘hacking multitude’ might be and how it might
operate. This is for three reasons.15 First, the photograph
speaks of a localised protest, in Istanbul here and now: it
immediately gives the context, which photography can so
effectively evoke. Second, it recalls the experience of
Internet censorship, its affective dimension. Notes written
on walls, such as directives or instructions, convey the
state of emergency proper of transformative moments.
There is here a sense of suspension: we do not know
what exactly these people are going to do with their
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new workaround, whether they will be able to successfully
activate it for their own purposes, or if they are already
spreading the news to others. In other words, this image
recalls ‘wirelessness’, ‘an experience trending toward
engagement with things, objects, gadgets, infrastructures
and services, and imbued with indistinct sensations and
practices of network-associated change’ (Mackenzie,
2011: 5). Importantly, ‘wirelessness’ is not a pure sensa-
tion of transition through digital networks and devices, a
flow at a push of a button, but an experience made of
attempts, errors and repetitions (Mackenzie, 2008). I
would argue that in moments of suspension between
actions and networks, the multitude’s reflexivity and its
potential for social interactions might be set in motion. Its
inherent virtuality is a relevant concept: it is in the nature
of a multitude to unpredictably respond to an evolving
situation (see Virno, 2003).
Finally, the photograph reminds us of the ordinariness
of the Internet. By-standers here look like ordinary
people: frankly, quite boring compared to mainstream
representations of hackerdom (e.g. the terrifying
Anonymous). They appear intent at modifying their com-
munication tools, ordinary mobile phones (‘ordinary’ as
used by Raymond Williams, as for mundane, vernacular,
‘of the people’). This is crucial for understanding what a
‘multitudo’ is. Its Latin root ‘multis’, which we translate
in English as ‘many’, mistakenly points to a vast number
of people. If that was the case, we would circularly fall
into a Big Data logic: the more data comes, the more
truthful data appears to be. Rather, I use multitude as
‘mob’, ‘rabble’ or ‘throng’, that is an indistinct and
unclassifiable group of individuals.16
After failing to adopt pressure directly on Twitter,
which appeared to stand for the ‘freedom of speech’,17
the Turkish government managed to block requests
negotiated via Google-owned or any other public
DNS. Similar to what happens in China,18 they heigh-
tened the level of censorship, moving the block to IP
level. There are few ways of doing this, but such a dis-
cussion is beyond the scope of this article. The import-
ant thing is that public DNS was now not effective,
because no Internet Service Provider in Turkey could
reach Twitter by IP address any longer. When Turkey
managed to block Twitter at IP level, more articulated
responses became necessary in order to avoid the ban.
Crucially, these had to be learned.
VPN time! (tweet)
The hacking game
I will now briefly explain the functioning of VPN and
TOR, emphasising first their popularity and then social
aspects around their implementation.
Virtual Private Network means that a user can
securely connect to a computer by using a technique
called ‘tunnelling’. The VPN client communicates over
the public Internet and sends the computer traffic
through an encrypted connection to a VPN server.
Using this connection, VPN customers can securely
access the Internet from their remote device, bypassing
any filtering included in their Internet Service Provider’s
policy. VPNs are usually offered as a pay-per service, so
trust is regulated by the terms of provision of such a
service. Therefore, there are a few drawbacks in this
method: reliance on private traffic, difficulties in setting
up secure client–server connections and security flaws
(e.g. institutional controls on the provider).
TOR, The Onion Router, is both a free software and
an open network that help users stay anonymous and
defend themselves against traffic analysis.19 TOR
bounces signal at least three times in several random
relays, to make it anonymous. For efficiency, TOR
uses the same circuit for no longer than 10 minutes.20
Moreover, each hop in the network exchanges an
encryption, or ‘onion skin’, around the original trans-
mission. TOR is not just an application, but an ever-
changing network of proxies, made of random relay
servers and strong encryptions. It provides a continuum
in which the degree of privacy is generally a ‘function of
the number of participating routers versus the number
of compromised or malicious routers’ (Wikipedia).21
TOR shreds to pieces the idea that the Net is con-
trollable in any single nation. It is not secure, but it is
anonymous. VPN is not anonymous, but it is probably
more secure (if you trust the service provider). To put it
bluntly, while VPN is a solution favoured by business
(it is a paid-for service, after all), TOR is the obvious
choice of ‘hackers’ (it is Free and Open Source, in fact).
Most of my interviewees had embraced VPN as their
favourite method for going online, and they generally
reported a hassle-free experience. Importantly, none of
them had ever used such tools before.
I decided to download VPN Unlimited on my Android
phone. It was easy to operate and didn’t seem to cause
too much speed or reliability issues.
Actually it was pretty easy. Through my friends’
advices I downloaded two VPN applications to my
mobile phone. (online interviews)
A participant, who describes themselves as ‘a source
with inside knowledge’,22 shared some metrics on
Twitter traffic from Turkey. Although not possessing
any ‘hard numbers’, the informant estimates that
‘around 20% of the total number’ of Turkish Twitter
accounts connected from a non-Turkish Internet
Provider (indirect evidence of people connecting via
8 Big Data & Society
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TOR or foreign VPN providers). Moreover, ‘around
50–80% of this traffic remained there two months
after the ban was lifted, which was a little surprising’.
This attitude to maintain some control over their
Internet privacy, even after the events, is confirmed
by all interviewees (mostly VPN users):
I currently use an open DNS number and have access to
blocked sites,23 but I’m considering to buy a yearly plan
on TunnelBear [VPN] so that I can browse privately.
In case of any future blockage especially on social net-
works, yes I will definitely use VPN services again.
Q: Are you going to use VPN again? A: If there is fur-
ther blockage, yes.
Q: Will you use TOR again? A: Still running and will
do! Q: What’s your experience? A: Experience? I fell in
love with it! (Online interviews, emphases added)
While VPN statistics are largely private, TOR
Project publishes all network traffic on their website24:
there is a sharp increase in TOR traffic after censorship
blocks in Turkey (blue dots) and a progressive reduc-
tion, confirming the release of censorship after the elec-
tions (red dots).
TOR actually works. It is in fact easy to set up as a
relay, in a way that users can share their bandwidth
with the anonymous network. It is even easier if a
user wants to just access the network without hosting
any part of it, by installing a modified version of
Firefox called TOR Browser Bundle, TBB.
TBB is fool proof. It is easy to use. No need to install
and configure software as TBB is ready to run. So
many people began to switch to TOR or TBB. It was
Twitter, forums and Bulletin Board Systems that made
TOR famous. TBB was the key for its adoption.
(Online interview)
I contend that the expertise and reflexivity which tech-
nology users acquire cannot simply vanish. Multitude’s
ability to learn, store and eventually perform,
unacknowledged, the fruit of its immaterial labour is
absolutely crucial (see Virno, 2003). From my first find-
ings on the Turkish case study, I would additionally
argue that many Internet practices transverse through
lines of activism, use and production of digital data, so
to encompass a broader, non-technology savvy multi-
tude of users. These create, maintain and amplify the
‘informational milieu’ (Terranova, 2004) which
supports more conventional hacking practices. For
instance, users participate in a newsletter, ask for help
or spread ‘proper’ hackers’ workarounds through social
networks or over material surfaces25:
I worry about the population’s huge percentage who
does not know English. I kindly request a TOR
browser pack in Turkish language for this. I hope
you guys share the same responsibility as I feel . . . I
can provide my service for translating every text in
the browser to Turkish. (TOR-talk mailing list, 26
March 2014)
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Here there is a demand, an offer for help and an initi-
ation of a dialogue with ‘you guys’, presumably TOR
developers and ‘proper’ hackers. Alleyne’s distinction
of three main strands of activities which characterise
‘hackers’ comes in useful here: open/clandestine prac-
tices, hacktivism and hardware hacking (2011). He sug-
gests an ‘integrated sociological understanding of
hacking’, which comprises these diverse set of practices:
The hack is no longer the exclusive act of the hacker.
When we make a web mash-up, a music or video
remix . . .we are also part of a blurring of the lines
between hackers and everyone else . . .We are all hack-
ers now. (Alleyne, 2011: 25)
At times this collaboration becomes more manifest
in spaces of the everyday. My main participant from
the TOR-talk mailing list, who defines themselves as a
‘help desk, system and network administrator’, narrates
this vivid account of his progressive involvement in the
Turkish events:
. . .The majority were Twitter users with their Twitter
nicknames asking for help to access Twitter via
TOR . . . Second round of TOR questions were how to
make it fast . . . Some users came up with questions
about cloaking of TOR. It put me in a situation that I
did not anticipate. I thought it was the end, but it turned
out to be not. People began asking for hidden
services26 . . . I got a particular email message from
someone. S/he offered to pay for my service. That was
all. I discarded it because I was overwhelmed with all
TOR, DNS, VPN questions. Same person contacted me
via email again. It was the same mail sent again. I again
discarded it. Same mail got into my inbox a few days
later. The email was from a non-profit organization. I
was asked not to disclose their name and location. They
were short on cash and wanted to set up a hidden service
for their interest groups which was vital for them. They
offered appraisal and blessings nothing more. I accepted
it. (Online interview, my emphases)
This account again manifests the sense of ordinariness
(e.g. not encrypted requests with their Twitter handle)
and the escalation to more complex hacking practices
which require learning and support.
Following the new hashtag #GoogleDN
SisBlockedinTurkey, my narrative of a ‘hacking multi-
tude’ became clearer by the hour. It was supported by
an increasing frequency of reflexive comments
regarding the weird game being staged live on the
Internet.
Every Turkish citizen has become some kind of Internet
expert/amateur hacker after the ban. (tweet, Istanbul)
[The] whole Turkey will be computer geeks:)
(tweet, Istanbul)
These comments seem to foresee an indistinct mass of
people, a multitude in fact, ready to take some control,
at least temporarily, on a complex regime of communi-
cation. The content of communication, the message
itself, takes a back stage:
I checked my personal and company Twitter accounts’
newfeeds. Although it was like a ghost town after a
couple of days, we decided to continue to tweet from
the company’s official account. (Online interview)
Despite my objectives are other than unpacking links
between technological networks and activism, I find it
symptomatic that Twitter felt ‘like a ghost town’. This
observation supports the thesis that, after all, Twitter
might not be central to urban protests. For my focus,
though, it is more important that my participant and
his colleagues ‘decided to continue to tweet’. Here,
form prevails over meanings, it evades codification.
The necessity to be present beyond data choke-points,
which undeniably pushed Twitter trends, unmasks the
performative aspect of data itself. In the above vignette,
there is a clear disconnection between how the network
is imagined (‘citizen journalism’, trends, global audi-
ence) and how it is experienced (‘a ghost town’).
Towards a ‘hacking multitude’?
Two propositions
My preliminary findings around Internet censorship in
Turkey show that an extensive attachment to the possi-
bility of acting beyond restrictions started appearing.
Not that this is always possible or that everyone wants
to do it, of course. However, Turkish users’ responses
give the sense of a growing contention around the ‘net-
work of networks’. This is partly due to the Internet
growing more complex and articulated, certainly
beyond traditional national jurisdictions.27 In my
study, there is some evidence – the spike in TORmetrics,
the leaked insight that part of Turkish users’ traffic was
from an ISP outside Turkey and the qualitative data col-
lected from online interviews and from Twitter – that
tactics of resistance to Internet censorship are learned
and amplified in unpredictable ways. In this final section,
I briefly explore two research trajectories which can fur-
ther develop the initial formulation of a ‘hacking multi-
tude’. They foreground some implications that this
generalization might have for the political, cultural or
economic processes more directly associated with data.
1. There is a solid argument in cultural studies around
the ubiquitous presence of software in everyday
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aspects of our lives (Kitchin, 2011). This presents a
whole set of issues around power (Lash, in Beer,
2009), surveillance (Lyon, 2014) and production of
value. Differently from traditional media audiences
(TV, radio and papers), social media consumers are
in fact also producers of data. We routinely share,
tag, like and comment, so contributing to Big Data
metrics. These actions are almost automatic, they
have become part of daily routines, they maintain
the flow, both as data and as practices of ‘evil
media’ (Fuller, 2012: 171). In other terms, most
uses of the Internet now involve some kind of ‘pro-
sumption’, a form of free labour in the production of
data (Fuchs, 2014; Hardt and Negri, 2000;
Lazzarato, 2002; Terranova, 2000). But, what hap-
pens when there is a disruption to everyday produc-
tion/consumption of data, such as a censorship
attempt? To what extent is a ‘hacking multitude’
able to disrupt, change, or maintain data flow?
And how is the concept of ‘flow’ in itself useful
when set against non-linear and unpredictable
processes of techno-tweaking?
2. This opens to a second tenet. If digital labour impli-
cates a social process of learning, a sort of ‘geo-
logical stratum’ of technological knowledge (Hardt
and Negri, 2000: 29), hacking can be imagined as a
sort of collective learning curve, a repository for
actions and resistance whenever the situation pre-
sents itself. I attempted to follow some of the excite-
ment brewing around the Twitter ban in Turkey:
Whenever they ban something, we learn something
new. (tweet, Istanbul)
Everyone has to learn now about VPN, DNS, and how
[the] Internet works. (tweet, Istanbul)
The relentless learning from practices of digital labour
foregrounds the possibility that software and digital
technologies can be used in more competent and reflex-
ive ways. The Turkish example brings some evidence
towards this kind of argument, but more research is
needed, especially around perception of TOR or other
data encryption systems from the perspective of every-
day users. To the extent that circumvention of censor-
ships and protection of own privacy might become a
‘hacking game’ for a multitude of users, production,
circulation and consumption of digital data can
become widely affected with regard to its volume, var-
iety and velocity. Moreover, by generating and replicat-
ing content over a banned platform, users of social
media create data with a higher intensity of affect,
both locally and across the globe. The text and photo-
graphs analysed here convey the experience of ‘hacking’
from an everyday perspective: the sense of enthusiasm,
frustration and radicalisation implied in the participa-
tion in a ‘hacking game’. Some of the individuals who
managed to avoid Twitter censorship in Turkey,
eagerly circulated insights learned during their digital
labour. They shared tips and enjoyed a newly acquired
status of ‘hackers’, among friends, colleagues and social
media followers.
It feels like fighting against Agent Smiths in [the]
Matrix movie. (tweet, Istanbul)
Concluding remarks
In trying to make sense of what happened in the Twitter-
sphere when the Turkish government blocked access to
the platform, I started looking at some Big Data metrics.
These are in the form of infographics and statistics on
Twitter traffic and trends. A solely quantitative analysis
of Twitter data would give the impression that data flows
seamlessly. But at a closer analysis, I would argue that the
metaphor of ‘flow’ does not capture the immaterial forms
of digital communication, par excellence: the sharing of
bits in the form of a 140-character tweet. What became
visible during the ‘digital coup’ were rather the material-
ities of social media systems – both the technological
workings of the Internet with switches and routers, and
the hacking practices of some of its users.
Censorship in Turkey gave space to a diffuse response
that moved beyond the technological, what I try to cap-
ture with the concept of a ‘hacking multitude’. The battle
for presence on Twitter filtered down to inventive pub-
lics that probably had little to do with microblogging.
Graffiti, banknotes, restaurant boards and so on were
more than the circulation of a piece of information;
they appear to be a legitimising stance towards
Internet freedom. Although difficult to quantify in met-
rics of traffic, this social space cannot be neglected.
The composite scenario I engaged with suggests that
there is a social, sensorial and affective dimension to the
way in which we produce, defend ourselves from, or con-
sume, the deluge of digital data. This dimension is emer-
gent, plural and unstable, like data itself. Ruppert et al.
argue that ‘digital data is itself a materiality that is
‘‘alive,’’ embodied and mobile’, it actualises ‘relations
and connections that are otherwise beyond perception
and thus inherent to the very imagining of social relations’
(2013: 28). This means that attaining to data meaningful-
ness is a trans-disciplinary effort, beyond the statistical
analysis of its occurrence. In the second part of the
paper, I focused on individual responses by way of ana-
lysing some tweets, photographs and the content of online
interviews. Digital ethnography and sociological dis-
course analysis are the methods I use to try to capture
this media ecology made of pixels, tweets, censorship,
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algorithms, bits and devices, but also of feelings, skills and
frustrated attempts. This methodological approach
attains to the particular and, therefore, to Small Data.
Working across – rather than simply mixing – quan-
titative and qualitative methods,28 I started a reflection
on an evolving scenario. The good thing about power-
ful visualisations, such as infographics, is the heuristic
impression they give of a growing, and otherwise hardly
accountable, exchange network (Ruppert et al., 2013:
36). However, it is the granularity of data itself, its
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particular composition and diversity, which makes vis-
ible ordinary users’ reactions. A ‘multitude’, in my
focus. Within this varied ensemble of data, a privileged
place belongs to photographs circulated by Turkish
Twitter users. Photographs make explicit the intercon-
nections between Big Data (in this case, tweets, trends
and hashtags) and other communication systems (in
this case, graffiti, banknotes, other social media and
leaflets). These interconnections are performed in
spaces of the everyday and possibly loaded with
affect.29 They are ‘the social’. However, they are invis-
ible in aggregate metrics of flow.
In the final part of the paper, I sketched the contours
of what I emphatically called a ‘hacking multitude’. This
idea nests on a more general argument on Internet free-
dom. Deibert (2012: 17) calls the current stage of
Internet relations ‘Access Contested’, pointing to a
‘patchwork of competing interests and values’ which
will eventually define the Internet of the future. Similar
to my argument, he talks of a ‘multitude of actors’.
Differently, he privileges institutional actors with a
stake in cyberspace policies and practices on either side
of the coin. These include giant corporations, civil soci-
ety groups and ‘public opinion’. It is in this novel recon-
figuration of cyberspace that we need to set localised
actions of ordinary people, such as forms of encryption
or bandwidth sharing. These practices might look
ingenuous. However, they form a sort of collective
repository of a multitude that, creatively and opportun-
istically, reacts to censorship and surveillance of the
Internet. They naively expose how this communication
and data creation system is open to modification.
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Notes
1. ‘Twitter is a menace to society, to all societies. All kinds of
immorality takes place there, families get separated; this is
against the party’s conservative agenda’; ‘All our national,
moral values have been put aside’ (various sources).
2. ‘Twitter and all – none of them are bigger than our nation’
(Speech in Bursa, Turkey; Reuters http://tiny.cc/ssucnx).
3. Neither did I interview taxi drivers in Istanbul. I take this
last point from satirist Karl Sharro: http://www.karlre-
marks.com/2013/03/its-ever-so-simple-tribal-map-of-
middle.html
4. The concept of ‘field’ is obviously contested, and evermore
so when related to virtual or digital ethnography.
5. http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/dec/07/twitter-
riots-how-news-spread (LSE and the Guardian).
6. See campaign from Istanbul-based NGO, the Association
of Alternative Informatics, who organised the
recent Internet Ungovernance Forum (September
2014) in Istanbul, about the strengthening of Internet
law 5651, central filtering, and the adoption of very con-
troversial Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) software, like
Phorm.
7. A 6000-member social media team of ‘young, tech-savvy
party members’ are said to have been hired and trained
to counter the Gezy Park movement on Twitter (Wall
Street Journal, September 2013). See also Morozov
(2011).
8. Wikipedia, various articles.
9. Hashtags are aggregating tools. They are increasingly
popular in social media analysis in order to make sense
of the vast array of messages exchanged on the popular
microblogging platform.
10. Helsinki-based digital security company that produces
Freedome. This is a mobile app which promises to com-
pletely anonymise its users by, among other things, set-
ting your virtual location to a different country. The WSJ
reported a similar percentage, citing Brandwatch, a firm
that analyses social media analytics. ‘The data, which
took a sample set of geolocated tweets over a two-hour
period, underscored how the ban appears to be
backfiring’.
11. According to data provided to @Mashable by Sysomos,
a social media analytics company.
12. We obviously don’t know how many of these are real.
13. Demographer Conrad Hackett has a solid record of pub-
lishing statistics on Twitter in the form of colourful
infographics.
14. I would like to thank online participants who circulated
my research blurb through their social media connec-
tions, and those Turkish users who replied with enthusi-
asm. Since it was not possible to have explicit consent
from every tweep involved, their responses have been
carefully anonymised. This obviously includes their
Twitter, Skype or email ‘handle’. All respondents who
spoke about TOR demanded an encrypted email
exchange, anyway.
15. Here, I adapt Hine’s ‘3E’ framework of Internet culture:
embedded-ness, embodiment and everydayness (2013).
16. Various online Latin dictionaries.
17. ‘We stand with our users in Turkey who rely on Twitter
as a vital communications platform. We hope to have full
access returned soon’ @Policy.
18. The ‘Great Firewall of China’ (Deibert, 2008).
19. This can be seen as a form of network surveillance that
might infringe personal freedom, privacy, confidential
business activities, relationships and state security (See
Lyon, 2014).
20. My TOR connection does exactly that, with random exit
points throughout the world.
21. For more information, visit TOR project blog: http://
tiny.cc/3za2jx. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs
has issued a $111,000 open call for Tor-cracking
proposals: http://tiny.cc/cya2jx.
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22. I did my best to check that my participants were who they
said (cross-checking) and/or that they were referred by
other participants (snow-balling).
23. More than 50k websites and twitter accounts are esti-
mated to be banned in Turkey at the present
(source: Internet Ungovernance Forum https://iuf.
alternatifbilisim.org).
24. Source: http://tiny.cc/4s5jnx. Details about how this esti-
mate is worked out: http://tiny.cc/h44jnx: ‘We can’t say
how many distinct users there are. . . We really count cli-
ents, but it’s more intuitive for most people to think of
users, that’s why we say users [there can be more users
behind each client]’.
25. Similar recognition seems to start taking place in software
culture. Reward Badges in Libreoffice project acknow-
ledge ‘an active contributor with zero experience in devel-
opment, who helps in many other ways: translating users’
guides, helping users on mailing lists and forums, writing
wiki pages, etc.’
26. These are .onion domains not in the DNS system, they
are only reachable via the network of TOR servers.
27. This argument can go either way of course: US NSA is
now well known for having spied on emails and other
traffic in many other countries.
28. See this discussion on Digital Sociology, http://tiny.cc/
yoimnx.
29. The affect of whoever not only took and circulated the
photograph, but also the affective experience of hacking,
whether by coding or spraying a DNS number.
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